It should escape no one that behind Justice Breyers veil of judicial modesty hides an inflated role for the Federal Judiciary. Strict scrutiny applies to any government classification based on race. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527, 535536 (1982) ([S]tate courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. Question: In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional. The plurality says that cases such as Swann and the others I have described all were decided before this Court definitively determined that all racial classifications . But the examples the dissent mentionsfor example, a provision of the No Child Left Behind Act that requires States to set measurable objectives to track the achievement of students from major racial and ethnic groups, 20 U. S.C. 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)have nothing to do with the pertinent issues in these cases. 662. (Enrollment Guide). These plans are unnecessarily crude solutions to the problem of school segregation, which can be achieved through more indirect means. The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. Grutter, supra, at 353 (opinion of Thomas, J.). See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schoolsCleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). 19. The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). "[6] Justice Breyer noted, "No one here disputes that Louisville's segregation was de jure" and cites a 1956 memo where the Seattle School Board admitted its schools were de jure segregated as well. An adoption by the court of a rule that has such connotations as authorizing discrimination of young people will surely question prior decisions holding the opposite and spur related litigation in years to come. 1, 50 (2002) (describing President Carters support for affirmation action). If so, its interpretation threatens to produce divisiveness among minority groups that is incompatible with the basic objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the race-conscious ranges at issue in these cases often have no effect, either because the particular school is not oversubscribed in the year in question, or because the racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range, or because the student is a transfer applicant or has a sibling at the school. 05915, p. 10; see also App. in McFarland I, pp. The Chief Justice finally concludes his opinion by answering some of the issues raised by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissent. Grutter emphasized that admitting minority students for the purpose of achieving racial balance, i.e., using a quota for this purpose, is unlawful. This conclusion is divorced from any evaluation of the actual impact of the plans at issue in these casesother than to note that the plans often have no effect. Post, at 46. Which of the following statements offers the most accurate comparison between this case and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)? In fact, all the cases Justice Breyers dissent cites as evidence of the prevailing legal assumption, see post, at 2527, were decided before this Court definitively determined that all racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). The dissent half-heartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of the color-blind Constitution. The legal showdown came in a landmark decision called Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. ices Office, District Summaries 19992005, available at Ed. of Ed. 2d 158. in No. Simply putting students together under the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students will learn together or even interact. See Education Commission of the States, Open Enrollment: 50-State Report (2007), online at http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=268. See also Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. See ante, at 1517, 23 (concurring opinion). in No. Dayton Bd. Once those vestiges were eliminated, Jefferson County was on the same footing as any other school district, and its use of race must be justified on other grounds. See, e.g., App. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. Even supposing it mattered to the constitutional analysis, the race-based student assignment programs before us are not as benign as the dissent believes. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that two were killed and hundreds were injured in race rioting subsequent to this Courts decision in Johnson). pols 101 ch 4 Flashcards | Quizlet See id., at 1032 (discussing other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions Care? It therefore reversed the lower courts original finding of no discrimination and remanded, instructing the lower court to issue an injunction to prevent the District from using this system. This is not to deny that there is a cost in applying a state-mandated racial label. Ante, at 17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? No. 05908, at19. . Without explicitly resting on either of these strands of doctrine, the dissent repeatedly invokes the school districts supposed interests in remedying past segregation. 1986) (citing Swann and North Carolina Bd. The new plan worked roughly as expected for the two school years during which it was in effect (19992000 and 20002001). . See Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, p. B1. Sch. See Tr. 1, p. 7 (We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens); Tr. gation plans. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. It used explicitly racial criteria in making these assignments (i.e., it deliberately assigned to the new middle schools black students, not white students, from the black schools and white students, not black students, from the white schools). The idea that government racial classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny did not originate in Adarand. Even if this purported distinction, which Justice Stevens would adopt, post, at 2, n.3 (dissenting opinion), had not been already rejected by this Court, the distinction has no relevance to these cases, in which students of all races are excluded from the schools they wish to attend based solely on the racial classifications. See Regents of Univ. While diversity may lend to a robust education, parents and students have their own opinions on what factors promote the best education possible. [29] The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. In addition, there is no evidence from the experience of these school districts that it will make any meaningful impact. Parents of school children sued the Seattle School Districts after their children were assigned to particular schools based on racial classifications to achieve integration in the school system. of Boston in 1968. Second, in Croson, the Court appeared willing to authorize a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible. Together with No. [Footnote 7], When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002, she sought to enroll her son, Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 20022003 school year. In the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions based on individual racial classifications, but it has nevertheless failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with only a minority of the students classified as white, it has employed the crude racial categories of white and non-white as the basis for its assignment decisions. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n.14; Freeman, 503 U. S., at 495496 (Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications). 1, supra. (b)Despite the districts assertion that they employed individual racial classifications in a way necessary to achieve their stated ends, the minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments suggests that other means would be effective. See ante, at 1112, 3132, n.16, 3435 (citing Adarand, supra, at 227; Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003)). The plurality tries to draw a distinction by reference to the well-established conceptual difference between de jure segregation (segregation by state action) and de facto segregation (racial imbalance caused by other factors). As early as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), this Court made clear that government action that rest[s] solely upon distinctions drawn according to race had to be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny. Id., at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (requiring a statute drawing a racial classification to be necessary, and not merely rationally related, to accomplishment of a permissible state policy); id., at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring) (The necessity test should be equally applicable in a case involving state racial discrimination). Those schools do not select their own students, and education in the elementary and secondary environment generally does not involve the free interchange of ideas thought to be an integral part of higher education. B. Explain the similarity in the facts between Brown V. Board of 2d 304. 16, 18. Thus, the programs are subject to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. That seemingly odd turnaround is merely a result of the fact that the remediation of de jure segregation is a jealously guarded exception to the Equal Protection Clauses general rule against government race-based decisionmaking. Until today, this Court understood the Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives, freedom to select the use of race-conscious criteria from among their available options. See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 74142 (No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process). (2000 ed., Supp. Perhaps the best example is provided by our approval of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1967 upholding a state statute mandating racial integration in that States school system. Brief for Petitioner at 11. KORRELL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER MR. KORRELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. It added that the fact that a law treats [a person] unequally because of his or her race . The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holdingdefining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher educationbut these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools. However, some students still must take public transportation. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Nevertheless, the dissent tries to cast doubt on the historical fact that the Seattle schools were never segregated by law by citing allegations that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other organizations made in court filings to the effect that Seattles schools were once segregated by law. And the fact that the state and local governments had relied on statements in this Courts opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court. 1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 2730, 32 (Mar. Section 4. 05908, at 7. CitationParents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. In part for those reasons, the Court has never permitted outright racial balancing solely for the purpose of achieving a particular racial balance. Tex. See, e.g., North Carolina Bd. Approximately half the districts public school enrollment was black; about half was white. I fear the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the democratic process, and for Americas efforts to create, out of its diversity, one Nation. No. Whats your understanding of when a school suffers from racial isolation? The plan that was the source of this litigation allowed students entering the ninth grade to rank the schools they wanted to attend. . Second, if the schools racial make-up was more than 15 percent out of line with the overall racial composition of the school district (classified only as white and nonwhite), then the students race was considered. 264, 399400 (1821) (Marshall, C. Id. And in his critique of that analysis, I am in many respects in agreement with The Chief Justice. The NAACPs First Legal Challenge and Seattles Response, 1969 to 1977. At issue were efforts for voluntary school desegregation and integration in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky. Louisville asserts several similar forward-looking interests, Brief for Respondents in No. We are not social engineers. 1. This Court has also held that school districts may be required by federal statute to undertake race-conscious desegregation efforts even when there is no likelihood that de jure segregation can be shown. would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to reflect that mixture. Swann did not hide its understanding of the law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a footnote, unread but by experts. If there were further remediation to be done, the District Court could not logically have reached the conclusion that Louisville ha[d] eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects. Ibid.

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